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The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core

  • Dades identificatives

    Identificador: imarina:6388306
    Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/imarina6388306
    Autors:
    Llerena FVilella C
    Resum:
    © 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. In this note, we give a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. As a consequence, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten in Decision theory and social ethics: issues in social choice, Reidel, Dordrecht, 289–301,  1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta and Ray in Games Econ Behav 3:403–422, 1991).

  • Altres:

    Autor segons l'article: Llerena F; Vilella C
    Departament: Gestió d'Empreses
    Autor/s de la URV: Llerena Garrés, Francisco / Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia
    Paraules clau: Lorenz domination Game theory Equity core Equal division core Cooperative game
    Resum: © 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. In this note, we give a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. As a consequence, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten in Decision theory and social ethics: issues in social choice, Reidel, Dordrecht, 289–301,  1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta and Ray in Games Econ Behav 3:403–422, 1991).
    Àrees temàtiques: Software Operations research & management science Mathematics, applied Mathematics (miscellaneous) Mathematics (all) Matemática / probabilidade e estatística Management science and operations research General mathematics Ciencias sociales Ciência da computação
    Accès a la llicència d'ús: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    ISSN: 14322994
    Adreça de correu electrònic de l'autor: cori.vilella@urv.cat francisco.llerena@urv.cat francisco.llerena@urv.cat
    Identificador de l'autor: 0000-0001-5023-0929 0000-0002-4898-8404 0000-0002-4898-8404
    Data d'alta del registre: 2024-09-07
    Versió de l'article dipositat: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
    Enllaç font original: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00186-015-0494-0
    URL Document de llicència: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Referència a l'article segons font original: Mathematical Methods Of Operations Research. 81 (2): 235-244
    Referència de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Llerena F; Vilella C (2015). The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core. Mathematical Methods Of Operations Research, 81(2), 235-244. DOI: 10.1007/s00186-015-0494-0
    DOI de l'article: 10.1007/s00186-015-0494-0
    Entitat: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Any de publicació de la revista: 2015
    Tipus de publicació: Journal Publications

  • Paraules clau:

    Management Science and Operations Research,Mathematics (Miscellaneous),Mathematics, Applied,Operations Research & Management Science,Software
    Lorenz domination
    Game theory
    Equity core
    Equal division core
    Cooperative game
    Software
    Operations research & management science
    Mathematics, applied
    Mathematics (miscellaneous)
    Mathematics (all)
    Matemática / probabilidade e estatística
    Management science and operations research
    General mathematics
    Ciencias sociales
    Ciência da computação

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