The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core

Identificador:  imarina:6388306

Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/imarina6388306

Autores:  Llerena, F; Vilella, C

Resumen:
© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. In this note, we give a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. As a consequence, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten in Decision theory and social ethics: issues in social choice, Reidel, Dordrecht, 289–301,  1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta and Ray in Games Econ Behav 3:403–422, 1991).