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The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core

  • Datos identificativos

    Identificador: imarina:6388306
    Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/imarina6388306
    Autores:
    Llerena FVilella C
    Resumen:
    © 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. In this note, we give a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. As a consequence, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten in Decision theory and social ethics: issues in social choice, Reidel, Dordrecht, 289–301,  1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta and Ray in Games Econ Behav 3:403–422, 1991).

  • Otros:

    Autor según el artículo: Llerena F; Vilella C
    Departamento: Gestió d'Empreses
    Autor/es de la URV: Llerena Garrés, Francisco / Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia
    Palabras clave: Lorenz domination Game theory Equity core Equal division core Cooperative game
    Resumen: © 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. In this note, we give a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. As a consequence, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten in Decision theory and social ethics: issues in social choice, Reidel, Dordrecht, 289–301,  1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta and Ray in Games Econ Behav 3:403–422, 1991).
    Áreas temáticas: Software Operations research & management science Mathematics, applied Mathematics (miscellaneous) Mathematics (all) Matemática / probabilidade e estatística Management science and operations research General mathematics Ciencias sociales Ciência da computação
    Acceso a la licencia de uso: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    ISSN: 14322994
    Direcció de correo del autor: cori.vilella@urv.cat francisco.llerena@urv.cat francisco.llerena@urv.cat
    Identificador del autor: 0000-0001-5023-0929 0000-0002-4898-8404 0000-0002-4898-8404
    Fecha de alta del registro: 2024-09-07
    Versión del articulo depositado: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
    Enlace a la fuente original: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00186-015-0494-0
    URL Documento de licencia: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Referencia al articulo segun fuente origial: Mathematical Methods Of Operations Research. 81 (2): 235-244
    Referencia de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Llerena F; Vilella C (2015). The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core. Mathematical Methods Of Operations Research, 81(2), 235-244. DOI: 10.1007/s00186-015-0494-0
    DOI del artículo: 10.1007/s00186-015-0494-0
    Entidad: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Año de publicación de la revista: 2015
    Tipo de publicación: Journal Publications

  • Palabras clave:

    Management Science and Operations Research,Mathematics (Miscellaneous),Mathematics, Applied,Operations Research & Management Science,Software
    Lorenz domination
    Game theory
    Equity core
    Equal division core
    Cooperative game
    Software
    Operations research & management science
    Mathematics, applied
    Mathematics (miscellaneous)
    Mathematics (all)
    Matemática / probabilidade e estatística
    Management science and operations research
    General mathematics
    Ciencias sociales
    Ciência da computação

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