Author, as appears in the article.: Llerena F; Vilella C
Department: Gestió d'Empreses
URV's Author/s: Llerena Garrés, Francisco / Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia
Keywords: Lorenz domination Game theory Equity core Equal division core Cooperative game
Abstract: © 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. In this note, we give a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. As a consequence, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten in Decision theory and social ethics: issues in social choice, Reidel, Dordrecht, 289–301, 1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta and Ray in Games Econ Behav 3:403–422, 1991).
Thematic Areas: Software Operations research & management science Mathematics, applied Mathematics (miscellaneous) Mathematics (all) Matemática / probabilidade e estatística Management science and operations research General mathematics Ciencias sociales Ciência da computação
licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
ISSN: 14322994
Author's mail: cori.vilella@urv.cat francisco.llerena@urv.cat francisco.llerena@urv.cat
Author identifier: 0000-0001-5023-0929 0000-0002-4898-8404 0000-0002-4898-8404
Record's date: 2024-09-07
Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
Licence document URL: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
Papper original source: Mathematical Methods Of Operations Research. 81 (2): 235-244
APA: Llerena F; Vilella C (2015). The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core. Mathematical Methods Of Operations Research, 81(2), 235-244. DOI: 10.1007/s00186-015-0494-0
Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Journal publication year: 2015
Publication Type: Journal Publications
Repositori URV