The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting

Identificador:  imarina:9289110

Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/imarina9289110

Autors:  Bannikova, Marina; Gimenez-Gomez, Jose-Manuel

Resum:
This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents’ decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective deadline—a moment in time when he/she prefers immediate agreement on any alternative, rather than future agreement on his/her most-preferred alternative. Our key finding shows that patience is not necessarily a main attribute of strategic advantage. When the first voter is the same at every stage, this voter will obtain his/her preferred alternative, even if he/she is the least patient one. However, this first movement advantage disappears when agents alternate as the first voter of each stage: in this case, the most patient voter always wins.