Articles producció científica> Economia

Moral hazard in repeated procurement of services

  • Identification data

    Identifier: PC:1846
    Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/PC1846
  • Authors:

    Patricia Esteve-González
  • Others:

    Department: Economia
    URV's Author/s: Esteve-González, Patricia
    Keywords: Incentius Risc moral Incentivos Riesgo moral Moral hazard Incentives
    Abstract: This paper analyzes repeated procurement of services as a two period model with a potential repeated agency relationship. In the first period, there is an incumbent who provides a service. In the second period, there is a contest stage in which the principal selects the next service provider. The agents¿ effort is non-contractible and the contest stage is the mechanism to mitigate potential moral hazard problems. The principal takes account of the past service effort in the contest stage by choosing the weight of past effort and the degree of substitutability between past and current efforts. The results show that, when the principal does not value contest effort, considering past effort as the relevant effort in the contest is optimal. When the principal values contest effort and effort cost increases, decreasing substitutability between efforts is optimal.
    Research group: CREIP
    Thematic Areas: Economia i empresa Economía y empresa Economics and business
    ISSN: 0167-7187
    Author identifier: 0000-0003-3740-1396
    Record's date: 2016-10-05
    Last page: 269
    Journal volume: 48
    Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
    Link to the original source: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718716301126
    Licence document URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    Article's DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.06.008
    Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Journal publication year: 2016
    First page: 244
    Publication Type: Article Artículo Article
  • Keywords:

    Incentius
    Incentius
    Risc moral
    Incentivos
    Riesgo moral
    Moral hazard
    Incentives
    Economia i empresa
    Economía y empresa
    Economics and business
    0167-7187
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