Departamento: Economia

Autor/es de la URV: Esteve-González, Patricia

Palabras clave: Incentius Risc moral Incentivos Riesgo moral Moral hazard Incentives

Resumen: This paper analyzes repeated procurement of services as a two period model with a potential repeated agency relationship. In the first period, there is an incumbent who provides a service. In the second period, there is a contest stage in which the principal selects the next service provider. The agents¿ effort is non-contractible and the contest stage is the mechanism to mitigate potential moral hazard problems. The principal takes account of the past service effort in the contest stage by choosing the weight of past effort and the degree of substitutability between past and current efforts. The results show that, when the principal does not value contest effort, considering past effort as the relevant effort in the contest is optimal. When the principal values contest effort and effort cost increases, decreasing substitutability between efforts is optimal.

Grupo de investigación: CREIP

Áreas temáticas: Economia i empresa Economía y empresa Economics and business

ISSN: 0167-7187

Identificador del autor: 0000-0003-3740-1396

Fecha de alta del registro: 2016-10-05

Página final: 269

Volumen de revista: 48

Versión del articulo depositado: info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion

Enlace a la fuente original: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718716301126

URL Documento de licencia: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/

DOI del artículo: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.06.008

Entidad: Universitat Rovira i Virgili

Año de publicación de la revista: 2016

Página inicial: 244

Tipo de publicación: Article Artículo Article