Identifier: TFG:10239
Authors: Martinez Montero, Iker
Abstract:
This study analyzes the distribution process of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) funds in Spain within the analytical framework of game theory and, specifically, the bankruptcy problem. By specifying a transferable utility game, the potential distributions of the Recovery, Transformation, and Resilience Plan (RTRP) funds among the Autonomous Communities are proposed based on various allocation rules: Proportional, CEA, CEL, and Talmud. The objective is to evaluate the distributive effects of the actual execution of the Plan considering criteria of equality, concentration, and stability, employing indicators such as the Gini index, the Lorenz curve, the coefficient of variation, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The results reveal that the actual allocation operates as a hybrid model that moves away from proportional neutrality to converge toward the CEA rule, acting as a mechanism for territorial cohesion that prioritizes regions with greater structural financing needs. However, the analysis identifies a tension between homogeneity of treatment and economic efficiency, suggesting that the high territorial penetration of resources could limit the critical mass necessary for an effective structural transformation of the productive fabric. In conclusion, the study demonstrates the validity of bankruptcy theory for interpreting the management of scarce public resources in multilevel governance environments.
Repositori URV